

Message Text

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-----053390 200330Z /62

R 191102Z MAY 78
FM AMEMBASSY BONN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8677
INFO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
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AMCONSUL DUSSELDORF
AMCONSUL FRANKFURT
AMCONSUL HAMBURG
AMCONSUL MUNICH
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MILITARY ADDRESSEES HANDLE AS SPECAT EXCLUSIVE

E.O. 11652: XGDS-1
TAGS: PEPR, PGOV, UR, GW
SUBJECT: APPRAISAL OF BREZHNEV'S VISIT TO THE FRG

REFS: (A) BONN 07941 (NOTAL) (B) BONN 08564 (NOTAL)

BEGIN SUMMARY

BREZHNEV'S VISIT TO THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC HAS IMPROVED THE TONE OF SOVIET-GERMAN RELATIONS WITHOUT RESOLVING ANY OF THE CONTENTIOUS ISSUES BETWEEN THE GERMANS AND RUSSIANS. BOTH SIDES CHOSE TO ACCENTUATE THE POSITIVE WITHOUT ELIMINATING THE NEGATIVE. GIVEN THE ALMOST PRECIPITOUS MANNER IN WHICH THE VISIT WAS FINALLY SCHEDULED, THAT IS PROBABLY ALL THEY COULD DO.

THE DETERMINATION BY BOTH SIDES TO SET A POSITIVE TONE FOR THE MEETING AND TO TRY TO INTRODUCE SOME STABILITY INTO THEIR RELATIONSHIP REMAINS AN IMPORTANT POLITICAL FACT DESPITE THE ABSENCE OF CONCRETE AGREEMENT. HOWEVER, THE LACK OF SUCH AGREEMENT -- ESPECIALLY ON BERLIN MATTERS -- CANNOT HELP BUT PREJUDICE THE FUTURE. THE QUESTIONS THAT WERE NOT SETTLED WILL NOT GO AWAY, AND THEY REMAIN TO HAUNT NOT ONLY SCHMIDT AND BREZHNEV BUT THEIR SUCCESSORS AS WELL.

FROM THE AMERICAN STANDPOINT, NOTHING THAT HAPPENED IN THIS VISIT APPEARS TO AFFECT OUR INTERESTS OR OBJECTIVES HERE. THE FRG REMAINS FULLY COMMITTED TO OUR ALLIANCE. REPORTED SOVIET EFFORTS TO ESTABLISH A MUCH CLOSER BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP WITH BONN APPARENTLY CAME TO NAUGHT. MOREOVER, IT SEEMS CLEAR THAT, WHILE SCHMIDT PREFERS A CONTINUATION OF DETENTE, THIS PRE-
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REFERENCE DOES NOT PRECLUDE CONTINUED FULL COMMITMENT TO WESTERN DEFENSE EFFORTS OR DEEP CONCERN ABOUT SOVIET POLICIES ELSEWHERE.

END SUMMARY

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1. BREZHNEV'S VISIT HERE PRODUCED A SERIES OF DOCUMENTS, MANY SPEECHES, AND A DISTINCT IMPROVEMENT IN THE TONE OF BONN-MOSCOW RELATIONS, BUT IT PRODUCED FEW CONCRETE RESULTS AND, SO FAR AS WE CAN NOW SEE, NO CHANGES OF POLICY BY EITHER PARTY.

2. EARLIER, WE HAD THE IMPRESSION THAT BOTH THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC AND THE SOVIET UNION HAD HOPED THAT THE IMPORTANCE ATTACHED TO THE VISIT WOULD PRODUCE PRESSURE FOR COMPROMISE BY THE OTHER. EACH APPEARED TO SEE THE VISIT AS SOMETHING THE OTHER WANTED AND WOULD BE PREPARED TO SUPPORT BY MODEST SHIFTS OF VIEWS. HOWEVER, AS PLANNING FOR VISIT BEGAN AND CONTENTIOUS ISSUES WERE EXAMINED NEITHER SIDE SAW THE NEED TO COMPROMISE. BOTH

CAME TO PERCEIVE THE VISIT PRIMARILY AS A DEVICE FOR ENHANCING THE CLIMATE OF THE RELATIONSHIP BY ACCENTUATING THE POSITIVE WITHOUT ELIMINATING THE NEGATIVE, AND THEY DID NOT MAKE ANY DETERMINED CRASH EFFORT TO ACHIEVE CONCRETE AGREEMENT ON DISPUTED ISSUES. PRESSING TOO HARD, THEY REASONED, RAN THE RISK OF JEOPARDIZING THE ATMOSPHERICS OF THE VISIT. THUS, THE PURPOSE OF PRE-SUMMIT TALKS, WHICH HAD TO BE COMPRESSED INTO A VERY TIGHT TIME FRAME, WAS TO REACH AGREEMENT FOR ITS OWN SAKE BY IGNORING OR PAPERING OVER DIFFERENCES.

3. NO BASIC PROBLEMS, THEREFORE, WERE SOLVED. THE DISAGREEMENTS OVER BERLIN REMAIN, AS DO DIFFERENCES OVER HUMAN RIGHTS, ARMS CONTROL IN CENTRAL EUROPE, THE MIDDLE EAST, AFRICA, ETC.

4. AS ONE RECITES THE LIST OF ISSUES THAT WERE DISCUSSED BETWEEN SCHMIDT AND BREZHNEV AS WELL AS FEATURED POSITIVELY IN THE COMMUNIQUE AND DECLARATION, IT IS

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ASTONISHING TO REALIZE HOW MANY OF THEM ARE NOT REALLY CENTRAL TO THE SOVIET-GERMAN RELATIONSHIP. THIS WAS, OF COURSE, BECAUSE THE ISSUES THAT ARE CENTRAL, SUCH AS OFFICIAL TERMINATION OF WORLD WAR II, REUNIFICATION, TIES BETWEEN BERLIN AND THE FRG, ARE ALL BEYOND AGREEMENT OR SOLUTION AT THE PRESENT TIME, ESPECIALLY BETWEEN BONN AND MOSCOW. OPPOSITION LEADER HELMUT KOHL BECAME A KIND OF ODD MAN OUT DURING THE GENERAL MOOD OF AMIABILITY BY EVEN REMINDING BREZHNEV AND OTHERS THAT THESE ISSUES ARE STILL AROUND AND POTENTIALLY EXPLOSIVE.

5. WHAT EACH SIDE THUS OBTAINED FROM THE OTHER WAS AN UNSPOKEN PLEDGE OF RESTRAINT OR AT LEAST CIVILITY. THIS PLEDGE DOES NOT APPEAR FORMALLY IN ANY OF THE DOCUMENTS OR EVEN IN THE SPEECHES, BUT IT IS IMPLICIT IN EVERYTHING THAT WAS SAID AND DONE HERE. IT REPRESENTS THE CONTINUATION OF DETENTE WITHOUT THE RESOLUTION OF, OR EVEN PROGRESS ON, SPECIFIC ISSUES. THE WILLINGNESS OF BOTH SIDES TO GO IN THIS DIRECTION ILLUSTRATES BOTH THEIR DESIRE FOR DETENTE AND THE ROAD BLOCKS THAT PREVENT AN EVEN CLOSER RELATIONSHIP.

6. BOTH SIDES ALSO BELIEVE THAT THEY HAVE ESTABLISHED A MEASURE OF STABILITY IN THE RELATIONSHIP. THIS HAS BEEN THE KEYNOTE OF BRIEFINGS WE HAVE RECEIVED FROM GERMAN OFFICIALS AND SOVIET DIPLOMATS HERE. FOR THE GERMANS, THIS MEANS STABILITY DURING THE POST-BREZHNEV INTERREGNUM WHICH THE GERMANS BELIEVE WILL LAST SEVERAL YEARS AND WHICH, BEFORE BREZHNEV'S VISIT, MANY THOUGHT

HAD ALREADY BEGUN. FOR THE SOVIETS, IT APPEARS TO MEAN STABILITY WITH THIS COALITION AND WITH WHATEVER MAY SUCCEED IT. BREZHNEV'S EMBRACE OF FRANZ-JOSEF STRAUSS, AND STRAUSS' POSITIVE REACTION, FORM PART OF THIS POLICY.

7. BOTH PARTIES' DETERMINATION TO SUSTAIN THIS STA-
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BILITY DESPITE LIMITED ACCORD ON SPECIFICS REMAINS AN IMPORTANT PART OF THE WORLD SCENE. GIVEN THE FAILURE TO AGREE ON A HOST OF ISSUES, AN ALTERNATIVE FOR EITHER PARTY WOULD HAVE BEEN TO BE RESERVED ABOUT THE TALKS OR EVEN TO PRONOUNCE THEM A STALEMATE. THAT THEY DID NOT DO SO UNDERLINES THE IMPORTANCE THAT THEY BOTH ATTACH TO GOOD RELATIONS EVEN IN THE ABSENCE OF SPECIFIC AGREEMENT. TO THIS EXTENT, THE DETENTE RELATIONSHIP INITIATED BY BONN AND MOSCOW ALMOST TEN YEARS AGO CAN BE SAID TO HAVE MATURED AND TO HAVE ACQUIRED ITS OWN WEIGHT AND IMPORTANCE TO BOTH PARTIES.

8. DOMESTIC POLICY MAY PROVIDE AT LEAST ONE REASON FOR THIS. AS WE INDICATED IN REF A, THE GERMANS CERTAINLY

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BELIEVE THAT SCHMIDT AND HIS GOVERNMENT WILL GAIN SOME
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DOMESTIC BENEFIT FROM THE POSITIVE TONE OF THE VISIT, ALTHOUGH THE SKEPTICAL TONE OF EDITORIAL COMMENTARY SUGGESTS THAT THIS, TOO, WILL BE LIMITED. GERMAN OFFICIALS ALSO TELL US THAT THEY BELIEVE BREZHNEV HOPES TO GAIN SOME DOMESTIC BENEFIT THROUGH ENHANCING HIS PRESTIGE IN THE USSR, AND MAY HAVE BEEN INFLUENCED AT LEAST IN PART BY THESE CONSIDERATIONS. WE ARE UNABLE TO JUDGE THE LATTER POINT, BUT THE VERY FACT THAT THE GERMANS BELIEVE IT HAS SOME SIGNIFICANCE.

9. THE VISIT ALSO DEMONSTRATES THAT, WHILE THEIR MUTUAL RELATIONSHIP REMAINS A VITAL ISSUE FOR BOTH GOVERNMENTS AND PEOPLES, IT IS NOT AT THE CENTER OF THEIR IMMEDIATE CONCERNS. NOW THAT THE VISIT IS OVER, SCHMIDT WILL RETURN TO HIS WORRIES ABOUT THE ECONOMY, ABOUT NATO, ABOUT THE FUTURE OF EUROPE, AND THE LIKE. BREZHNEV PRESUMABLY WILL RETURN TO HIS CONCERNS ABOUT CHINA, SALT, THE SOVIET ECONOMY, AND THE LIKE. THE VISIT HERE, SEEN IN THIS CONTEXT, APPEARS TO REFLECT A DESIRE BY BOTH PARTIES TO AVOID HAVING CONTENTIOUS PROBLEMS DISRUPT THEIR RELATIONSHIP WHILE THEY CONCENTRATE THEIR ENERGIES ON OTHER MATTERS. THEY WANT TO KEEP A LINE TO EACH OTHER AND TO MAINTAIN A POSITIVE IF UNEASY RELATIONSHIP AS A CONSTANT IN A TROUBLED WORLD.

THE FUTURE

11. IT IS PREMATURE AND PROBABLY POINTLESS TO EVALUATE THE FUTURE IMPACT OF THIS VISIT IN CONCRETE TERMS. THE GERMANS HAVE NOT TOLD US WHETHER THERE IS ANYTHING THAT THEY WILL NOW DO DIFFERENTLY BECAUSE OF THE BREZHNEV VISIT AND THE DOCUMENTS IT PRODUCED. ON BALANCE, WE DOUBT THAT THEY OR THE SOVIETS WILL ACT VERY DIFFERENTLY.

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12. BERLIN REMAINS THE MOST FRACTIOUS ISSUE, AND THE ONE ON WHICH MUTUAL COMMITMENTS OF RESTRAINT ARE LEAST CLEAR. WE HAVE BEEN TOLD VARIOUSLY (1) THAT SCHMIDT PLEDGED NOT TO ESTABLISH ADDITIONAL FEDERAL OFFICES IN BERLIN AND (2) THAT HE MADE NO SUCH PLEDGE BUT MERELY INDICATED THAT THE FRG WOULD EXERCISE "RESTRAINT" IN ITS POLICY TOWARD BERLIN. BY THE SAME TOKEN, WE HAVE BEEN TOLD THAT THE GERMANS SEE BREZHNEV'S SILENCE IN RESPONSE TO SCHMIDT'S PRESENTATION ON BERLIN AS (1) A PLEDGE OF RESTRAINT OR (2) AN INDICATION OF INDIFFERENCE TOWARD AN ISSUE HE NOW REGARDS AS SECONDARY. MUCH IS IN THE EYE OF THE BEHOLDER.

13. ON THE BASIS OF VARIOUS BRIEFINGS HERE, WE THINK THAT THE GERMANS AND PERHAPS EVEN THE SOVIETS MAY BE EXCESSIVELY HOPEFUL. THE OPTIMISM IN SOME FRG CIRCLES ABOUT BERLIN SEEMS LARGELY BASED ON BREZHNEV'S SILENCE. WE HAVE HEARD OF NO CONCRETE SOVIET PLEDGE TO ALTER SOME OF THE BERLIN POLICIES THAT HAVE GENERATED FRICTION, ESPECIALLY ITS PERSISTENT DRIVE TO GIVE WEST BERLIN A SEPARATE POLITICAL STATUS. EVEN IF SCHMIDT DID PLEDGE TO ESTABLISH NO MORE FEDERAL OFFICES, WHICH WE DOUBT HE WAS IN A POSITION TO DO AS CATEGORICALLY AS WAS REPORTED TO US BY ONE SOURCE, SCHMIDT CAN NOT ABANDON EFFORTS TO INCLUDE BERLIN IN THE EC OR CHANGE PLANS FOR BERLIN MAYOR STOBBE TO ASSUME THE BUNDESRAT PRESIDENCY WHEN IT COMES HIS TURN. MOREOVER, THE LACK OF PROGRESS ON BERLIN CLAUSES IN THE THREE PENDING SOVIET-GERMAN AGREEMENTS CLEARLY INDICATES THAT NEITHER SIDE IS PREPARED TO CHANGE ITS BASIC ATTITUDE ON THE FUTURE OF THE CITY.

14. THE ABSENCE OF CONCRETE AGREEMENTS MEANS THAT THE RESTRAINT AND STABILITY THAT SCHMIDT AND BREZHNEV WORKED TO ACHIEVE MAY NOT LONG PREVAIL. NEITHER IS PLEDGED TO

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ALTER THE POLICIES THAT PRODUCED THE TENSIONS SUPPOSEDLY
EASED BY THE VISIT. THEREFORE, THERE IS NO REASON TO
BELIEVE THAT THE TENSIONS CANNOT AND WILL NOT RISE AGAIN.
CERTAIN DYNAMIC TRENDS, LIKE BERLIN'S INCLUSION IN THE
EUROPEAN COMMUNITY OR THE SS-20 BUILD-UP, MAY MAKE IT
INEVITABLE. MOREOVER, WHILE THEY REGARD THEIR DESIRE
FOR DETENTE AS A RESTRAINING INFLUENCE ON THEMSELVES,
THEY MAY ALSO REGARD IT AS A SIMILAR RESTRAINT ON THE
OTHER AND THUS EXPECT TOO MUCH.

15. THESE KINDS OF PROBLEMS APPLY NOT ONLY TO BERLIN
BUT ACROSS THE BOARD. THE SOVIET UNION MAY WELL BE
INTERESTED IN GETTING GREATER GERMAN ASSISTANCE IN
SIBERIA BUT ALL THE SIGNS INDICATE TO US THAT THE

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GERMANS HAVE NEITHER THE CAPACITY NOR THE INTEREST TO
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PROVIDE THE KIND OF MASSIVE CAPITAL SUPPORT NEEDED THERE. NOR DO WE SEE IN ANY SOVIET STATEMENTS A SIGN THAT THE SOVIET UNION WILL SLOW THE PACE OF ITS ARMS DEPLOYMENT IN EASTERN EUROPE OR CHANGE ITS ADVENTUROUS POLICY IN AFRICA, THOUGH BOTH THESE SOVIET POLICIES GENERATE A VERY NEGATIVE POLITICAL REACTION HERE. ONE COULD EVEN GO SO FAR AS TO OBSERVE THAT THE GREATEST PRESSURE ON BONN AND MOSCOW FOR AN IMPROVEMENT IN THE ATMOSPHERE IS NOW PAST SINCE THE BREZHNEV VISIT HAS TAKEN PLACE, AND THAT BOTH SIDES MAY FEEL LESS RATHER THAN MORE RESTRAINED.

16. THIS SAID, ONE SHOULD NOT OUT OF HAND DISMISS THE LIKELIHOOD THAT BOTH SIDES WILL AT LEAST TAKE THE OTHER'S VIEWS INTO CONSIDERATION SOMEWHAT MORE. WE WOULD EXPECT THAT THEY WOULD TALK TO EACH OTHER WITH GREATER FREQUENCY THAN IN THE PAST, AND PERHAPS ATTEMPT TO OFFER MORE CONCILIATORY EXPLANATIONS OF WHAT THEY ARE DOING. EACH MAY TAKE UNILATERAL STEPS TO EASE TENSIONS: FOR EXAMPLE, WE ASSUME THE SOVIETS WILL CONTINUE TO URGE THE GDR TO AVOID PROVOCATIONS AT THE WALL OR BORDER. ALTERNATELY, BOTH SIDES MAY ATTEMPT TO SHAPE DOMESTIC OPINION IN DIRECTIONS LESS LIKELY TO PROVOKE CONFRONTATION, AS SPD LEADER WEHNER DID LAST WEEK WHEN HE ASSERTED THAT SOME GERMAN ACTIONS IN BERLIN HAD BEEN ILL-JUDGED. THUS, THE TONE OF SOVIET-GERMAN RELATIONS MAY WELL IMPROVE FOR A TIME, EVEN IF THE SUBSTANCE DOES NOT. THE PROBLEM THAT WE PERCEIVE IS THAT ULTIMATELY SUBSTANCE CANNOT HELP BUT AFFECT TONE AND WE HAVE YET TO SEE ANY INDICATION THAT THE SUBSTANCE OF SOVIET-GERMAN RELATIONS WILL MATERIALLY CHANGE DESPITE THE POSITIVE TONE OF THE BREZHNEV VISIT.

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THE US INTEREST

17. THE SUCCESS OF BREZHNEV'S VISIT HERE UNDERLINES AN IMPORTANT DISTINCTION BETWEEN AMERICAN AND GERMAN REALITIES REGARDING DETENTE. IT IS POSSIBLE FOR THE GERMANS TO HAVE DETENTE WITH MOSCOW ON THE BASIS OF MUTUAL RESTRAINT. WE, HOWEVER, NEED TO HAVE CONCRETE AGREEMENT ON ONE OF THE MOST CENTRAL CONCERNS OF EACH GOVERNMENT: THE STRATEGIC BALANCE.

18. GIVEN THIS DIFFERENCE, WE NEED AT LEAST TO ASK WHETHER THERE IS A CHANCE THAT US AND GERMAN ATTITUDES ON DETENTE MIGHT DIVERGE, ESPECIALLY IF THERE WERE NO SALT AGREEMENT, AND WHETHER WE SHOULD REGARD THE BREZHNEV VISIT AS A HARBINGER OF SUCH A DIVERGENCE.

19. WE BELIEVE THAT THIS NEED NOT HAPPEN AND WILL NOT HAPPEN. AS WE HAVE REPORTED ELSEWHERE, SCHMIDT WANTS VERY MUCH TO SEE A CONTINUATION OF DETENTE AT THE STRATEGIC LEVEL, AND HE WILL THUS SUPPORT A SALT AGREEMENT THAT DOES NOT MANIFESTLY THREATEN THE BALANCE IN EUROPE. THUS, EVEN THOUGH SCHMIDT KEEPS PUSHING HARD ON SUCH MATTERS AS THE CRUISE MISSILE AND ON SOME CONTROL OVER GRAY AREA SYSTEMS, WE BELIEVE HE WOULD BE AT LEAST EQUALLY DISTRAUGHT IF SALT WERE TO FAIL AND A STRATEGIC ARMS RACE -- WITH THE ACCOMPANYING CHANGE IN THE POLITICAL CLIMATE -- WERE TO ACCELERATE.

20. AT THE SAME TIME, IF SALT WERE TO FAIL, THERE IS A POLITICAL BASIS WITHIN THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC FOR A POLICY OF INCREASED DEFENSE EXPENDITURES AND A TOUGHENED STAND TOWARD THE EAST. DESPITE HIS COMMITMENT TO DETENTE, SCHMIDT HAS ALWAYS BEEN CAREFUL TO AVOID LOSING CONTACT WITH THAT POLITICAL BASE. THIS IS ONE OF THE PRINCIPAL ISSUES, ALTHOUGH IT IS NOT OPENLY ARTICULATED, BETWEEN HIM AND THE LEFT WING OF THE SPD.

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21. NOTHING IN THE BREZHNEV VISIT HAS CHANGED THESE REALITIES. IT APPEARS CLEAR THAT BREZHNEV HAS MADE NO COMMITMENT TO RESTRAIN THE SOVIET ARMS BUILD-UP IN EASTERN EUROPE: IT ALSO SEEMS QUITE CLEAR THAT SCHMIDT HAS MADE NO COMMITMENT ON SUCH WESTERN ARMS ISSUES AS THE ENHANCED RADIATION WEAPON. MOREOVER, NOTHING THAT

SCHMIDT HAS SAID DURING THE VISIT WOULD PRECLUDE HIGHER DEFENSE EXPENDITURES IF THEY BECOME NECESSARY. THEREFORE, WHILE THE VISIT AND SCHMIDT'S STRESS ON ITS POSITIVE ASPECTS HAVE UNDERLINED THE FRG'S COMMITMENT TO DETENTE, THEY DO NOT PRECLUDE A SHIFT IN POLICY IF OUTSIDE REALITIES WERE TO COMPEL SUCH A SHIFT.

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22. WHAT SEEMS MORE LIKELY IS THAT SCHMIDT WILL CONTINUE TO PURSUE A POLICY OF DETENTE ON THE ONE HAND AND FULL SUPPORT OF WESTERN MILITARY ALLIANCE ON THE OTHER. THE GERMANS HAVE DONE THIS FOR SOME TIME. IF IT HAD BEEN BREZHNEV'S INTENT TO MOVE THEM AWAY FROM THAT POLICY, HIS VISIT CERTAINLY FAILED. ON THE OTHER HAND, ALTHOUGH THE GERMANS HAVE TOLD US AT VARIOUS LEVELS THAT THE SOVIETS WERE INTERESTED IN DEVELOPING A MUCH CLOSER BILATERAL BONN-MOSCOW RELATIONSHIP, WE FIND IT DIFFICULT TO BELIEVE THAT THE KREMLIN COULD REALISTICALLY EXPECT MAJOR SHIFTS IN GERMAN ATTITUDES WHEN IT WAS NOT PREPARED TO PAY A PRICE ON KEY SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES.

23. IN OUR OPINION, THE PRINCIPAL THREAT TO THE SOLIDARITY OF THE WESTERN ALLIANCE DOES NOT LIE IN THE KIND OF BLANDISHMENTS TO THE FRG THAT THE SOVIETS HAVE SO FAR BEEN ABLE TO MUSTER. A MORE SERIOUS THREAT COULD BE THE SOVIET MILITARY BUILD-UP AND ITS CONSEQUENT INTIMIDATION OF WESTERN EUROPE. PERHAPS BREZHNEV'S VISIT IS INTENDED TO MAKE THIS BUILD-UP APPEAR LESS THREATENING AND TO PERSUADE THE GERMANS TO ACCEPT IT AS A REALITY. IF SO, THE VISIT ALSO APPEARS TO HAVE FALLEN SHORT OF THIS PURPOSE, SINCE ALL CONVERSATIONS WE HAVE HAD WITH SERIOUS GERMANS AFTER BREZHNEV'S DEPARTURE REFLECT PERSISTENT GERMAN CONCERN ABOUT THE SOVIET BUILD-UP -- A CONCERN THAT SCHMIDT ALSO DIRECTLY VOICED TO BREZHNEV.

24. WHAT THE VISIT DID ACHIEVE, IN TERMS OF THE OVERALL GLOBAL PICTURE, IS A COMMITMENT TO A CONTINUING INDEPENDENT GERMAN-RUSSIAN DIALOGUE OF A KIND THAT IS AS MUCH HISTORICAL AS POLITICAL IN CHARACTER. THIS DOES NOT MEAN A RETURN TO RAPALLO, AS THE FOREIGN MINISTRY HAS BEEN AT ALMOST EXCESSIVE PAINS TO POINT OUT TO US.

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IT DOES MEAN, HOWEVER, THAT THE GRMANS WOULD HOPE DURING ANY WORSENING OF THE GENERAL INTERNATIONAL ATMOSPHERE AT LEAST TO AVOID BEING MOSCOW'S FAVORITE WHIPPING BOY AS THEY OFTEN HAD BEEN DURING THE 1950'S AND 1960'S. WE ASSUME IT MIGHT ALSO MEAN THAT THE SOVIETS WOULD HOPE FOR A CONTINUATION OF THE ECONOMIC RELATIONSHIP AND PER-

HAPS SOME OTHER BENEFITS HERE IN CASE WASHINGTON-MOSCOW
RELATIONS GO SOUR.

25. IT IS IMPORTANT TO UNDERSTAND THE LIMITS OF WHAT
WOULD BE POSSIBLE HERE. EVEN AFTER THE BREZHNEV VISIT,
IT IS QUITE CLEAR THAT MOSCOW AND BONN SEE THE WORLD
FROM VERY DIFFERENT PERSPECTIVES. MOREOVER, MOST OF THE
ISSUES THAT THEY DISCUSSED CAN NOT BE SOLVED BILATERALLY
BETWEEN THEM. THEREFORE, EVEN IF THE SOVIETS MIGHT HOPE
THAT THEY COULD SUSTAIN A CLOSE RELATIONSHIP WITH THE
FRG SEPARATE FROM WHATEVER MIGHT HAPPEN BETWEEN
WASHINGTON AND MOSCOW, WE DO NOT HAVE THE IMPRESSION
THAT SUCH AN EFFORT COULD GET VERY FAR. BUT BOTH SIDES
APPEAR TO BE INTERESTED IN ESTABLISHING A MEASURE OF
STABILITY AND CIVILITY, AND ONE CAN ONLY ASSUME THAT
THEY WOULD WISH TO SUSTAIN THIS NO MATTER WHAT THE
INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE.

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26. ON THE BASIS OF THIS ANALYSIS, WE AFFIRM THE PRE-
LIMINARY ESTIMATE OF REFTEL (A) TO THE EFFECT THAT
NOTHING COMING OUT OF THE BREZHNEV VISIT HAS NARROWED
OUR OWN OPTIONS OR DAMAGED GERMAN-AMERICAN ABILITY TO
COLLABORATE ON ANY KIND OF INTERNATIONAL OR POLITICAL
POLICY, SUBJECT TO OBVIOUS PHYSICAL AND HISTORICAL
LIMITATIONS. IN FACT, IF THE VISIT HAS DEMONSTRATED
ANYTHING AT ALL, IT IS THAT NEITHER MOSCOW OR BONN CAN
LOOK TO EACH OTHER TO SOLVE MOST OF THE PROBLEMS THAT
CONCERN THEM. SUCH A ROLE, FOR EACH OF THEM, CAN STILL
BE PLAYED ONLY BY THE AMERICANS.

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Message Attributes

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Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: GW
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 19 may 1978
Decaption Date: 20 Mar 2014
Decaption Note: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 20 Mar 2014
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1978BONN09179
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: RR
Errors: N/A
Expiration:
Film Number: n/a
Format: TEL
From: BONN
Handling Restrictions:
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1978/newtext/t19780538/aaaabfyk.tel
Line Count: 693
Litigation Code IDs:
Litigation Codes:
Litigation History:
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE
Message ID: 3b73179a-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Office: ACTION SS
Original Classification: SECRET
Original Handling Restrictions: EXDIS
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 13
Previous Channel Indicators: n/a
Previous Classification: SECRET
Previous Handling Restrictions: EXDIS
Reference: 78 BONN 08564 (NOTAL)
Retention: 0
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 19 may 2005
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review Media Identifier:
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
SAS ID: 2630488
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: APPRAISAL OF BREZHNEV'S VISIT TO THE FRG
TAGS: PEPR, PGOV, UR
To: SECSTATE WASHDC MOSCOW MULTIPLE
Type: TE
vdkgvwkey: odb://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS_Docs/3b73179a-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Review Markings:
Sheryl P. Walter
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
20 Mar 2014
Markings: Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014